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During 1985 the aid agencies which gave assistance to
Chadian refugees in Darfur were concerned that they'
were attracting local people to their camps. These
local people would attempt to pass themselves off as
refugees - a relatively simple task as most came from
the sanie ethnic groups as the relugees - and thereby
gain access to loor! rations. The relief agencies were
also concerned that food distributed principally in the
towns was drawing in the surrounding rural
population, creating pert-urban relief shelters. Later
in the famine and during its immediate aftermath,
experts working for a rural development programme
in the south-west of Darfur became concerned that
food aid would have severe negative cotisequences in
the long term:
The farmers in the project area have lost both their
markets and their labour supply. This will mean
that in future seasons those farmers will be less
willing to produce a surplus and the grain required
by the deficit areas of north Darfur will have to be
supplied continually by grain imported into the
region. [Jebel Marra Rural Development Project
(JMRDP) 1986:6].
lt was feared that the large harvest of 1985, in
combination with the continued distribution of free
food, would lower the price of grain, make it
unnecessary for poor rural people to engage in
agricultural wage labour, inflating labour rates and
creating a labour shortage, leading to a situation
where it would be unprofitable to bring in the harvest,
much of which would simply be left to rot in the fields.
Hence, during 1984-86 in Darfur, there were people
who were arguing for stopping food aid to some
sections of the population, because it was having
harmful effects, and in some cases, for stopping it
altogether.
Many people also argued that food relief was essential.
In the first half of 1985. journalists and relief workers
predicted that hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
would starve in Darfur and the neighbouring regions
unless massive amounts of food aid were delivered
immediately [de Waal !987b1. In the following year,
1986, early estimates for Darfur's food aid needs were
as high as 75 per cent of those of the preceding year. In
January 1986 Oxfam and Save the Children Fund
announced to the public that four million Sudanese
still faced starvation unless food aid were provided.
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Introduction
People who give assistance to the poor tend to see their
assistance as a very important fact ni the lives of the
poor people who receive that assistance, even the
central fact in the poor people's lives. For the givers of
aid, it is a premise that aid is a good thing. Even critics
of aid to poor countries, and here we must make a
special mention of the critics of food aid, concede that
emergency food aid, or famine relief, is a necessary
and good thing. However, I suspect that the support
for emergency food aid by these critics is related to the
highly emotional nature of most discussions of
famine. The subject of famine arouses such strong
emotions that rational thought often gives way to
superficial moralising. No one wants to be against
food aid to famine victims, lest they reap the scorn
directed at Malthusian political economists in
England in the 1840s:
I have always felt a certain horror of political
economists', said Benjamin Jowett. the celebrated
Master of Balliol. since! heard one of them say that
the famine of 1848 in Ireland would not kill more
than a million people, and that would scarcely be
enough to do any good'. [Quoted in Woodham-
Smith 1963:375-6].
Nevertheless, while no one is publicly opposed to
famine relief in general, there have been many critics
of individual relief programmes. Famine relief
programmes have been accused of creating
dependency. This they are alleged to do by drawing the
recipients of relief into client relationships with aid
agencies, by depressing grain prices and hence
disrupting local food production, by displacing
traders from the grain market, or, more insidiously, by
producing a state of mind in the recipient population
whereby they see themselves as dependent, and lose
the motivation towards self-reliance.
This article is based upon a case study of the famine of
1984-85 in Darfur, Sudan, and its immediate
aftermath. This case illustrates these points well.
Most ot the empirical content of iltis paper derives from IS months'
work in Sudan. mostly in Darfur. during 1985-87. This was made
possible by the support of the Eeonomic and Social Research
Council of London and Save the Children Fnnd (UK). Many
individuals helped with the research, of whom Malek el Amin
deserves a special mention.
Fortunately, during 1985 millions did not die - in
Darfur perhaps 100.000 at most - and during 1986
there were no deaths attributable to the famine. On
occasions, relief agencies have claimed some or all of
the credit for these 'disasters averted'.
The scene is set for a confrontation. Was food aid
essential during 1984-86 in Darfur, and did it save
much of the population from death and destitution?
Or did it. at least in pari, have severe adverse
consequences leading to the 'dependency syndrome'?
There is some truth in both claims.. However, I think
that there is more truth in a third claim, one that is
rarely considered in this and similar debates: that
famine relief was irrelevant.
Famine Relief and Famine Mortality
The great majority of famine relief given in Darfur
consisted of grain: sorghum. lt was donated in the
belief that it would save lives. Between December 1984
and December 1985 nearly 98.000 metric tonnes of
grain were distributed, a mean of 32.2 kg per head.
During 1986 a further 61,000 tonnes were distributed.
These amounts part of one of the largest peace-time
relief operations ever mounted. Yet there is no
evidence that consuming this grain saved anyone's life.
In this article I can only summarise data and
arguments that I have presented in more detail
elsewhere [see de Waal 1989]. Approximately 100.000
people are estimated to have died on account of the
famine in Darfur. The majority of these were children
aged between one and four years. This ranks the
famine as exceptionally severe by modern African
standards, though probably not comparable to the
famine experienced at the same time in northern
Ethiopia. However, the causes of famine mortality
were not to be found in reduced consumption of foods.
People in rich and poor families were equally likely to
die during the famine. For instance, households which
were defined as at or above subsistence level, on the
basis of land and animal ownership and off-farm
sources of income, had a death rate of 30.1 per
thousand per year over the two years from June 1984
to June 1986 (much higher during the peak famine
months of January to September 1985). Those defined
as below subsistence level had a death rate of 27.5 per
thousand per year over the two years. The difference is
not statistically significant. The poorest eight per cent
of households had a death rate of 34.1 per thousand,
not significantly different from the 28.7 per thousand
of the remainder.
People in rich and poor villages were equally likely to
die. From the ten sites studied, the two poorest had
death rates of 30.5 and 25.9 per thousand, and the two
richest had death rates of 38.4 and 26.0 per thousand.
Those in women-headed households had a death rate
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of 25.4, those in male-headed households had a death
rate of 29.7. Receipt of food aid made no evident
difference to the chances of dying. The figures here are
less clear. This is because the sites which received most
food aid already had lower mortality rates, despite
being poorer. and many places did not receive food aid
until the end of 1985, when an excellent harvest was
being gathered in, and the situation was already
returning to normal.
Excess mortality was instead due to severe localised
health crises. The drought and famine caused
enormous movements of people, breakdown of
sanitation facilities, and an acute shortage of clean
water. Under these conditions, potentially lethal
diseases such as the diarrhoeas and measles became far
more prevalent, and consequently more people died.
Some forms of relief did directly address the causes of
excess mortality. Water supplies were improved in a
few locations, there were emergency programmes of
inoculation against major childhood diseases in other
parts. These programmes probably saved lives. The
distribution of supplementary foods, such as milk and
oils, which can be used for weaning children, probably
also had a positive impact on the health of the most
vulnerable children. However, sorghum, which
represented the majority of the aid, had no such
effects.
The proponents of food relief can also argue - and
have argued - that it prevented deaths, indirectly.
That is, the grain saved lives, not because people
consumed it and thereby improved their nutritional
status, but because of its impact on people's so-called
'survival strategies'. Specifically, it has been argued
that the policy of distributiong food relief to the
villages from mid-1985 into 1986 maintained people in
those villages. These people would otherwise have
migrated to towns and been exposed to lethal health
crises. This argument is based on similar premises to
the argument that food relief, distributed to the main
population centres, is a bad thing in that it draws rural
people to these places and thereby precipitates health
crises. These lines of argument bring us to a
fundamental assumption in the debate for and against
food relief: that the presence of food relief significantly
influences what rural people, stricken by famine,
choose to do. It is the validity of this assumption that
needs to be investigated.
Food Relief and the Choice of 'Survival
Strategies'
Did the availability of food relief in certain places
draw people to those places, and in the case of people
already there, keep them there? At first sight, there
appear to be a number of instances which confirm the
power of food relief to attract people to it. On closer
scrutiny, however, each of these examples appears to
be slightly suspect. Moreover there are counter-
examples which suggest that food relief was a much
weaker 'pull factor' than other things could be. These
other factors include rainfall during the planting
season, and the possibility of earning an income from
low-status trades such as selling firewood or water.
One example of the apparent pulling power of food
relief is the presence of local people in the Chadian
refugee camps in and near Dar Masalit during 1985.
The refugee camps themselves were set up on the
principle of forcibly moving refugees to them. Those
responsible for administering the camps saw such
local Sudanese as people enticed by the chance of free
food rations, masquerading as refugees to cheat the
system. The implication was that these people had
abandoned their previous lives, as farmers, for life as a
dependent of a relief agency. I have discussed the
social and ethnic dynamics of the phenomenon of
locals 'becoming refugees' elsewhere, and argued that
it was a manifestation ofa tradition of ethnic change in
response to shifting power relations between com-
munities [de Waal 1988]. In the past, communities that
came under the hegemony of a certain ethnic group,
say Fur, would obtain security by 'becoming Fur'. In a
similar way, during 1985, local people 'became
refugees' to enjoy the temporary advantages of that
status. However, for the purposes of this argument,
the relevant point is that for local people, moving to a
refugee camp did not mean abandoning their farms or
turning down alternative sources of income. Most of
the Sudanese in refugee camps were extremely local,
and while they resided in the camps they also
cultivated their fields. By 1986 most of the Chadian
residents of the refugee camps were also cultivating in
the surrounding villages [Ruiz 1987]. Those who lived
further away left the camps at the onset of the rains,
precisely in order to cultivate. By living in the camps
these people were also not passing up the chance of
gaining an income from an off-farm low-status trade;
in this area the market in low-status trades collapsed
entirely. That is to say, food relief did act as a 'pull
factor', but chiefly because of the absence of other
competing pull factors.
A second apparent counter-example is the growth of
the famine camp at Hujerat, adjacent to Buram town
in south Darfur, from no one to 20,000 people between
March and May 1985. The immediate cause of the
growth of the camp was the policy of the town council,
which created the formal entity of the famine camp
and made food rations available to all those who
registered there. However, most of the people of
Hujerat were not 'pulled' immediately from the
surrounding rural area. Instead they were villagers
who had previously been drawn to the town by the
possibility of earning a dry-season income there. By
March they were encamped around Buram in informal
squatter camps. Moving to Hujerat did not interfere
with their primary reason for migrating to the town,
earning an income. When the rains arrived during the
planting season, the camp dispersed. Hence the 'pull
factor' of food relief was only supplementary to a
stronger pull factor, that of the chance of earning a
dry-season income, and did not counteract the pull
factor of cultivating during the wet season.
A third apparent counter-example comes from north-
east Darfur. This was the clustering of the populations
of small villages around larger population centres such
as Mellit. Saiyah and Malha. These larger centres were
receiving most of the aid, which did not begin to reach
villages in the northern parts until September and
October. However, once again, other pull factors were
at work. Specifically, there were opportunities for
earning a dry-season off-farm income, which drew
people to these centres, and the onset of the rains,
which drew them away. A striking example is the
people who congregated around Malha, who were
some of the most desperate to be found anywhere in
Darfur. During June and July, as the rains began, and
months before food relief began to reach the villages,
these people began to leave Malha and return home to
plant. Farmers near Malha town complained of a
labour shortage, despite wage rates which had tripled.
However, in these cases the critical factor in people's
movement was not a pull factor but a 'push factor'.
Because of the drought, shallow wells in the villages
dried up in the dry season of 1984-88, and in the
absence of drinking water, people had had no
alternative but to move away.
The argument against food relief acting as a significant
pull factor is made stronger by investigating instances
where it failed to have any effect at all. One such
instance is the case of the famine camp at Mawashei,
on the outskirts of the regional capital, el Fasher. Most
of the people in the camp came during the dry season
of 1984-85, from areas close to the town. In this area
during this period the pre-head distribution of relief
grain was the highest in Darfur. Mawashei itself
received no general distribution of food until October
1985. In March and April of 1985 the per-head
distribution to the villages near to el Fasher was higher
than during the preceding and following months, but
the people of Mawashei stayed in the camp, where they
received no free food. During May the village
distributions fell to a level of one third of that of the
preceding months, but most people in Mawashei chose
this month to leave the camp. The people said they
came to the town in order to earn a dry-season income,
and left in order to plant their fields. The timing of
their coming and going suggests that this was true, and
that the presence of food relief had little impact on
what they chose to do.
The comparison of these cases also makes another
point. It might be argued that the distribution of relief
grain to migrant settlements gave people there more
resources, and thereby made it possible for them to
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leave and return to their farms. However, while relief
certainly made lt easier for people to return, it was not
a necessary condition tor it. In the places. such as
Mawashet. where little or no relief was received,
people still chose to leave to cultivate at the Onset of
the rains, and most were able to do so.
In fact, throughout Darfur, during May and June
1985, famine victims left camps where relief was
available, towns were casual work was available. and
richer rural areas where larm work was available, and
went home to villages where none of these were to be
had, but where they could begin to cultivate for the
coming season. At this time, people were exceptionally
hungry; they were eating once a day or once in two
days. and eating mostly grain-substitutes such as wild
leaves and berries. There was no prospect of a harvest
for four or five months. Yet people walked away from
the relief and the chance of an income to buy food, in
order to try to grow food for the coming season.
Turning to the immediate aftermath of the famine,
there is also little evidence for the presence of food
relief having a significant impact on the decisions
made by rural people. Early pessimism that the 1985
grain harvest would not be brought in, and that richer
smallholders would cease to plant large areas of grain,
proved to be unfounded. The same project that had
earlier forecast these disastrous effects of food aid
later reported only 'delays' in harvesting and the
utilisation of more family labour [JMRDP 1985,
summary pli]. It is true that the area planted to grain
in 1986 was 17 per cent down on the area in 1985. But
this decrease must be seen in the context of the large
expansion of area planted to grain in 1985: up toSO per
cent in some parts. When compared to the years 1980-
84, the area planted to grain in 1986 was merely four
per cent less. Moreover, there was an increased
planting of groundnuts between 1985 and 1986,
amounting to 14 per cent. There was also a shortage of
labour during the 1985-86 dry season compared to a
year previously. However, much of this shortage was
due to incidental factors, such as the escalation of the
war in southern Sudan preventing southern migrant
labourers from coming to Darfur, and 1984-85 was a
year of exceptional over-supply of labour [see de Waal
1987a:143]. Moreover, much of the work harvesting
and threshing is paid in grain, at a fixed rate. Hence,
because the post-famine price of grain was much lower
than the price during the famine, the real labour rates
were also lower [Pearson 1986:21. Consequently it
cannot be argued that labour rates rose during the
1985-86 dry-season, immediately post-famine, and it
could be argued that low real rates of pay contributed
to the shortage of labour.
Rural people in Darfur showed little sign of any
'dependency syndrome'. In fact, their stubborn refusal
to take food relief or wage labour when it interfered
with the more important tasks of cultivating their own
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field suggests a 'self-reliance syndrome'. Their own
statements about food relief confirm this: it was
greeted with surprise, and nobody expected it to
continue. In the towns, and aniong government
employees, the attitude was very different. These
people saw the provision of cheap or free food as a
right. The government likewise saw an obligation to
provide for its own employees and for townspeople.
The government's initial plan for food relief involved
distributing substantial amounts - one third of the
total - to these groups. When subsidised grain was
not available in towns such as el Fasher and Mellit the
citizens rioted. However, in rural areas, such perceived
governmental duties to citizens did not exist. Here.
food relief was instead an unexpected bonus, and
nobody made decisions on the expectation that it
would continue.
Food Relief and the Success of 'Survival
Strategies'
There is powerful evidence to suggest that the presence
of food relief did not substantially alter the decisions
that famine victims (and other rural people) made
during and immediately after the famine of 1984-85 in
Darfur. That is not to say that food relief had no effect.
There is also good evidence to suggest that food relief
improved people's chances of avoiding destitution
during the famine. Evidence for this lies in the
comparative trends of sales of small livestock and the
taking-out of debts in areas that did and did not
receive food relief [de Waal 1987a:l34-5]. In mid-
1985, in areas that were receiving food relief, people
sold fewer animals than before and took out fewer
debts than before. Elsewhere, the numbers of sales and
new debts were similar to or greater than before. The
differences were small but appreciable.
In 1985, relief agencies gave food aid to Darfur with
the intent of saving lives. There is no evidence that the
food they gave had any direct effect in this respect. The
effect of food aid in indirectly preventing deaths is
more complex. In some instances, poorly managed
food relief probably caused deaths, by creating famine
camps such as Hujerat in Buram. Later in 1985, food
relief distributed to the villages was one factor among
many that kept people from coming to the towns. In
both instances it is easy to overstate the importance of
food relief in determining what people chose to do. It
is not possible to say whether food relief, acting
indirectly, caused fewer deaths than it prevented; only
that the numbers involved were relatively small.
For those who advocated food relief to Darfur in
1984-85, the fact that it served to prevent a certain
amount of destitution was an incidental benefit. For
those who received the aid, the prevention of
destitution was of primary importance. Famine
victims in Darfur held that they had no control over
their chances of dying during the famine. They did
believe that they had power over their chances of
preventing destitution, that is. preserving the basis of
their future livelihood. Consequently, their primary
aim during the famine was not to minimise that
probability of dying, but to keep their animals alive.
and to cultivate. The strategies they followed arc
therefore better described as 'anti-destitution strategies'
than 'survival strategies'. Rural people used food relief
as one resource in order to assist them to preserve their
assets and cultivate. Frequently they stored it for
consumption later on, such as during the planting
season. Even when the distribution had been minimal.
people who left relief camps frequently took with them
a sack or more of grain, saved from their rations. On
other occasions they sold relief grain to buy more
important items, such as seeds, tools or transport
home. In this respect food relief was not irrelevant,
instead it was a rather inefficient form of income-
supplement.
During 1986, the rationale of food relief to Darfur
changed. It was distributed with the explicit aim to
preventing further impoverishment among the
vulnerable population, so that rural people could re-
establish their livelihoods: the programme was
designed primarily as a transfer of income, not as a
means of nutritional support.2
Conciusion
This article has come to strong conclusions about the
role - or lack of it - of famine relief with respect to
rural people's survival during the famine of 1984-85 in
Darfur. These conclusions should not be uncritically
generalised. For example, the situation in northern
Ethiopia is different in two important respects: wild
foods are much less available; and the area has a much
longer and more continuous tradition of statecraft,
and much more recent experience of food aid. Darfur
has not been subject to close government control since
the early years of the century, and 1984-85 was the first
large food aid programme ever in the region. The
state, and consequently organised relief, is much more
ideologically distant in Darfur than many other parts
of the world.
It is easy to overstate both the positive and negative
effects of food relief. Perhaps this is because food relief
is much more important in the lives of relief agency
employees, local government administrators, and
2 A discussion of the rationaleof this programme. ihe measuremeni
of vulnerabiliiy, and ihe effects of the distribution are beyond the
scope of this paper. For details of this programme: see Buckley
1988.
consultant academics than it is in the lives of rural
people. Certainly, it is among the officials of district
councils and regional ministries in Sudan that the
'dependency syndrome' is to be found, and not among
the farmers and pastoralists. The presence of relief
agencies and food aid often seemed to divert the
attention of such officials from long-term develop-
mental issues, and to remove from them the
responsibility for tackling local problems. Food aid as
faniine relief lias relevant to rural people in Darfur,
but it was relevant in unexpected ways. It was much
less relevant in preventing destitution than were other
factors in the economy and ecology of the region, and
it was largely irrelevant to physical survival.
The implication of this is that rather than arguing for
and against food relief, as though it were the only
possible form of large-scale famine relief, one should
recognise its severe limitations, and investigate other
forms of relief, that might directly save lives and
prevent destitution. In the present debate on famine
relief, or rather, the present lack of debate, food relief
does have one fundamental negative impact. By its
existence it obscures the need for effective forms of
famine relief.
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